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On the Exact Solution to a
Smart Grid Cyber-Security Analysis Problem
Kin Cheong Sou, Henrik Sandberg and Karl Henrik Johansson
Abstract—This paper considers a smart grid cyber-security
problem analyzing the vulnerabilities of electric power networks
to false data attacks. The analysis problem is related to a
constrained cardinality minimization problem. The main result
shows that an l1 relaxation technique provides an exact optimal
solution to this cardinality minimization problem. The proposed
result is based on a polyhedral combinatorics argument. It is
different from well-known results based on mutual coherence
and restricted isometry property. The results are illustrated on
benchmarks including the IEEE 118-bus and 300-bus systems.
Index Terms—Power network state estimation, security, oper-
ation research, optimization methods.
I. INTRODUCTION
A modern society relies critically on the proper operation of
the electric power distribution and transmission system, which
is supervised and controlled through Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Through remote
terminal units (RTUs), SCADA systems measure data such
as transmission line power flows, bus power injections and
part of the bus voltages, and send them to the state estimator
to estimate the power network states (e.g., the bus voltage
phase angles and bus voltage magnitudes). The estimated
states are used for vital power network operations such as
optimal power flow (OPF) dispatch and contingency analysis
(CA) [1], [2]. See Fig. 1 for a block diagram of the above
functionalities. Any malfunctioning of these operations can
delay proper reactions in the control center, and lead to
significant social and economical consequences such as the
northeast US blackout of 2003.
The technology and the use of the SCADA systems have
evolved a lot since the 1970s when they were introduced. The
SCADA systems now are interconnected to office LANs, and
through them they are connected to the Internet. Hence, today
there are more access points to the SCADA systems, and also
more functionalities to tamper with. For example, the RTUs
can be subjected to denial-of-service attacks (A1 in Fig. 1).
The communicated data can be subjected to false data attacks
(A2). Furthermore, the SCADA master itself can be attacked
(A3). This paper focuses on the cyber security issue related
to false data attacks (A2), where the communicated metered
measurements are subjected to additive data attacks. A false
data attack can potentially lead to erroneous state estimates
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Fig. 1: Block diagram of power network control center and
SCADA. RTUs connected to the substations transmit and
receive data from the control center using the SCADA system.
At the control center, a state estimate is computed and then
used by Energy Management Systems (EMS) to send out
commands to the power network. The human figures indicate
where a human is needed in the control loop. This paper
considers the false data attack scenario in A2.
by the state estimator, which can result in gross errors in OPF
dispatch and CA. In turn, these can lead to disasters of signif-
icant social and economical consequences. False data attack
on communicated metered measurements has been considered
in the literature (e.g., [3]–[10]). [3] was the first to point out
that a coordinated intentional data attack can be staged without
being detected by state estimation bad data detection (BDD)
algorithm, which is a standard part of today’s SCADA/EMS
system. [3]–[5], [7]–[10] investigate the construction problem
for such “unobservable” data attack, especially the sparse ones
involving relatively few meters to compromise, under various
assumptions of the network (e.g., DC power flow model [1],
[2]). In particular, [3] poses the attack construction problem as
a cardinality minimization problem to find the sparsest attack
including a given set of target measurements. [4], [5], [8] set
up similar optimization problems for the sparsest attack includ-
ing a given measurement. [7], [10] seek the sparsest nonzero
attack and [9] finds the sparsest attack including exactly two
injection measurements. The solution information of the above
optimization problems can help network operators identify
the vulnerabilities in the network and strategically assign
2protection resources (e.g., encryption of meter measurements)
to their best effect (e.g., [5], [6], [10]). On the other hand,
the unobservable data attack problem has its connection to
another vital EMS functionality, namely observability analysis
[1], [2]. In particular, solving the attack construction problem
can also solve an observability analysis problem (this is to be
explained in Section II-C). This connection was first reported
in [7], and was utilized in [11] to compute the sparsest critical
p-tuples for some integer p. This is a generalization of critical
measurements and critical sets [1].
To perform the cyber-security analysis in a timely manner,
it is important to solve the data attack construction problem
efficiently. This effort has been discussed, for instance, in [3]–
[5], [7]–[10]. The efficient solution to the attack construction
problem in [4] is the focus of this paper. The matching pursuit
method [12] employed in [3] and the basis pursuit method
[13] (l1 relaxation and its weighted variant) employed in [10]
are common efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) approaches to
suboptimally solve the attack construction problem. However,
these methods do not guarantee exact optimal solutions, and
in some cases they might not be sufficient (see for instance [8]
for a naive application of basis pursuit and its consequences).
While [7], [10] provide polynomial-time solution procedures
for their respective attack construction problems, the problems
therein are different from the one in this paper. Furthermore,
the considered problem in this paper cannot be solved as a
special case of [7], [10]. In particular, in [7] the attack vector
contains at least one nonzero entry. However, this nonzero
entry cannot be given a priori. [10] needs to restrict the number
of nonzero injection measurements attacked, while there is
no such requirement in the problem considered in this paper.
In [4], [5] a simple heuristics is provided to find suboptimal
solutions to the attack construction problem. This heuristics,
however, might not be sufficiently accurate. [8], [11], [23] is
most closely related to the current work. The distinctions will
be elaborated in Section IV-B.
The main conclusion of this paper is that basis pursuit
(i.e., l1 relaxation) can indeed solve the data attack con-
struction problem exactly, under the assumption on the net-
work metering system that no injection measurements are
metered. The limitations of this assumption will be discussed
in Section IV-A. In fact, the main result identifies a class
of cardinality minimization problems where basis pursuit can
provide exact optimal solutions. This class of problems include
as a special case the considered data attack construction
problem, under the assumption above.
Outline: Section II describes the state estimation model
and introduces the optimization problems considered in this
paper. Section III describes the main results of this paper – the
solution to the considered optimization problems. Section IV
compares the proposed result to related works. Section V
provides the proof the proposed main results. Section VI
numerically demonstrates the advantages of the proposed
results.
II. STATE ESTIMATION AND CYBER-SECURITY ANALYSIS
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS
A. Power network model and state estimation
A power network with n + 1 buses and ma transmission
lines can be described as a graph with n + 1 nodes and ma
edges. The graph topology can be specified by the (directed)
incidence matrix B0 ∈ R(n+1)×ma , in which the direction of
the edges can be assigned arbitrarily. The physical property
of the network is described by a nonsingular diagonal matrix
D ∈ Rma×ma , whose nonzero entries are the reciprocals of
the reactance of the transmission lines.
The states of the network include bus voltage phase angles
and bus voltage magnitudes, the latter of which are typically
assumed to be constant (equal to one in the per unit system).
In addition, since one arbitrary bus is assigned as the reference
with zero voltage phase angle, the network states considered
can be captured in a vector θ ∈ [0, 2pi)n. The state estimator
estimates the states θ based on the measurements obtained
from the network. Under the DC power flow model [1], [2]
the measurement vector, denoted as z, is related to θ by
z = Hθ +∆z, where H ,
[
PDBT
QBDBT
]
. (1)
In (1), ∆z can be either a vector of random error or intentional
additive data attack (e.g., [3]). B ∈ Rn×ma is the truncated
incidence matrix (i.e., B0 with the row corresponding to
the reference node removed), and P consists of a subset
of rows of an identity matrices of appropriate dimension,
indicating which line power flow measurements are actually
taken. Together, PDBT θ is a vector of the power flows on the
transmission lines to be measured. Analogously, the matrix Q
selects the bus power injection measurements that are taken.
QBDBT θ is a vector of power injections at the buses to be
measured. Therefore, H is the measurement matrix, relating
the measured power quantities to the network states. The
number of rows of H is denoted m.
The measurements z and the network information H are
jointly used to find an estimate of the network states denoted
as θˆ. Assuming that the network is observable, it is well-
established that the state estimate can be obtained using the
weighted least squares approach [1, Chapter 5] [2, Chapter 8]:
θˆ = (HTWH)
−1
WHT z, (2)
where W is a positive definite diagonal weighting matrix,
typically weighting more on the more accurate measurements.
The state estimate θˆ is subsequently fed to other vital SCADA
functionalities such as OPF dispatch and CA. Therefore, the
accuracy and reliability of θˆ is of paramount concern.
To detect possible faults in the measurements z, the BDD
test is commonly performed (see [1], [2]). In one typical
strategy, if the norm of the residual
residual , z −Hθˆ = (I −H(HTWH)−1WHT )∆z (3)
is too big, then the BDD alarm will be triggered.
3B. Unobservable data attack and security index
The BDD test is in general sufficient to detect the presence
of ∆z if it contains a single random error [1], [2]. However, in
face of a coordinated malicious data attack on multiple mea-
surements the BDD test can fail. In particular, [3] considers
unobservable attack of the form
∆z = H∆θ (4)
for an arbitrary ∆θ ∈ Rn. Since ∆z as defined in (4) would
result in a zero residual in (3), it is unobservable from the BDD
perspective. This was also experimentally verified in [14] in a
realistic SCADA system testbed. To quantify the vulnerability
of a network to unobservable attacks, [4] introduced the notion
of security index for an arbitrarily specified measurement. The
security index is the optimal objective value of the following
cardinality minimization problem:
minimize
∆θ∈Rn
‖H∆θ‖0
subject to H(k, :)∆θ = 1,
(5)
where k is given, indicating that the security index is computed
for measurement k. The symbol ‖ · ‖0 denotes the cardinality
of a vector and H(k, :) denotes the kth row of H . The
security index is the minimum number of measurements an
attacker needs to compromise in order to attack measurement
k undetected. In particular, a small security index for a
particular measurement k means that in order to compromise k
undetected it is necessary to compromise only a small number
of additional measurements. This can imply that measurement
k is relatively easy to compromise in an unobservable attack.
As a result, the knowledge of the security indices allows the
network operator to pinpoint the security vulnerabilities of
the network, and to better protect the network with limited
resource. To model the case where certain measurements are
protected (hence cannot be attacked) [3], [5], [6], problem (5)
becomes:
minimize
∆θ∈Rn
‖H∆θ‖0
subject to H(k, :)∆θ = 1
H(I, :)∆θ = 0,
(6)
where the protection index set I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} is given,
H(I, :) denotes a submatrix of H with rows indexed by I.
By convention, the constraint H(I, :)∆θ = 0 is ignored when
I = ∅. Hence, (5) is a special case of (6).
C. Measurement set robustness analysis
Problem (5) is also motivated from another important state
estimation analysis problem, namely observability analysis [1],
[2]. The measurement set, described by H in (1), is observable
if θˆ can be uniquely determined by (2). An important question
of observability analysis is as follows:
minimize
J
‖J ‖0
subject to rank(H(J¯ , :)) < n
rank(H(J¯ ∪ {k}, :)) = n
k ∈ J .
(7)
In above, k is a given index and J¯ denotes the complement
of J (for index set I in the rest of the paper, I¯ denotes its
complement). The meaning of (7) is as follows: J denotes
a subset of measurements from the measurement system
described by H . The condition that rank(H(J¯ , :)) < n
means that the measurement system becomes unobservable
if the measurements associated with J are lost. That is, it
becomes impossible to uniquely determine θˆ from H(J¯ , :).
The problem in (7) seeks the minimum cardinality J which
must include a particular given measurement k. Therefore, if
there exist a measurement k which leads to an instance of
(7) with a very small objective value, then the measurement
system is not robust against meter failure. Special cases of (7)
have been extensively studied in the power system community.
For instance, the solution label sets of cardinalities one and
two are, respectively, referred to as critical measurements and
critical sets containing measurement k [1]. Their calculations
have been documented in, for example, [1], [15]–[18]. For the
more general cases where the minimum cardinality is p > 2,
the solution label set in (7) is a critical p-tuple which contains
the specified measurement k [11], [19]. Solving (5) solves (7)
as well. The justification is given by the following statement
inspired by [7], and proved in Appendix:
Proposition 2.1: Let H ∈ Rm×n and k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} be
given for problems (5) and (7). Denote the two conditions:
I: H(k, :) 6= 0.
II: H has full column rank (= n).
The following three statements are true:
(a) Problem (5) is feasible if and only if condition I is
satisfied.
(b) Problem (7) is feasible if and only if conditions I and
II are satisfied.
(c) If conditions I and II are satisfied, then (5) and (7)
are equivalent (see Definition 1 in Section V-A).
Note that if condition I is not satisfied, then the corresponding
measurement k should be removed from consideration. Also,
since measurement redundancy is a common practice in power
networks [1], [2], H can be assumed to have full column rank
(= n). Therefore, conditions I and II in Proposition 2.1 can be
justified in practice. Finally, note that Proposition 2.1 remains
true for arbitrary matrix H (not necessarily defined by (1)).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULT
A. Problem statement
As discussed previously, this paper proposes an efficient
solution to the security index (i.e., attack construction) prob-
lem in (6). However, the proposed result focuses only on a
generalization of a special case of (6). In this special case, H
in (1) does not contain injection measurements:
H = PDBT . (8)
The limitation of the assumption in (8) will be discussed in
Section IV-A, after the main result is presented.
4In the Appendix, it is shown that the special case of (6)
with the assumption in (8) is equivalent to
minimize
∆θ∈Rn
∥∥P (I¯, :)BT∆θ∥∥
0
subject to P (k, :)BT∆θ = 1
P (I, :)BT∆θ = 0.
(9)
Instead of considering (9) directly, the proposed result pertains
to a more general optimization problem associated with a
totally unimodular matrix (i.e., the determinant of every square
submatrix is either −1, 0, or 1 [20]). In particular, the
following problem is the main focus of this paper:
minimize
x∈Rn
∥∥A(I¯, :)x∥∥
0
subject to A(k, :)x = 1
A(I, :)x = 0,
(10)
where A ∈ Rm×n is a given totally unimodular matrix, and
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} are given. Since B
in (9) is an incidence matrix, PBT is a totally unimodular
matrix. Therefore, (10) is a generalization of (9). However,
neither (10) nor (6) includes each other as special cases.
B. l1 relaxation
Problem (10) is a cardinality minimization problem. In
general, no efficient algorithms have been found for solving
cardinality minimization problems [21], so heuristic or relax-
ation based algorithms are often considered. The l1 relaxation
(i.e., basis pursuit [13]) is a relaxation technique which has
received much attention. In l1 relaxation, instead of (10), the
following optimization problem is set up and solved:
minimize
x∈Rn
∥∥A(I¯, :)x∥∥
1
subject to A(k, :)x = 1
A(I, :)x = 0,
(11)
where in the objective function in (11) the vector 1-norm
replaces the cardinality in (10). Problem (11) can be rewritten
as a linear programming (LP) problem in standard form [22,
pp. 4-6, p.17]:
minimize
x+,x−,y+,y−
|I¯|∑
j=1
(
y+(j) + y−(j)
)
subject to A(I¯, :)(x+ − x−) = y+ − y−
A(k, :)(x+ − x−) = 1
A(I, :)(x+ − x−) = 0
x+ ∈ Rn+, x− ∈ Rn+, y+ ∈ R|I¯|+ , y− ∈ R|I¯|+ ,(12)
where |I¯| denotes the cardinality of the index set I¯.
If (x+, x−, y+, y−) is a feasible solution to (12), then
x , x+ − x− is feasible to (10). Hence, an optimal solution
to (12), if it exists, corresponds to a suboptimal solution to
the original problem in (10). An important question is under
what conditions this suboptimal solution is actually optimal to
(10). An answer is provided by our main result, based on the
special structure in (10) and the fact that matrix A is totally
unimodular.
C. Statement of main result
Theorem 3.1: Let (x⋆+, x⋆−, y⋆+, y⋆−) be an optimal basic
feasible solution to (12), where A, k and I are defined in
(10). Then x⋆ , (x⋆+ − x⋆−) is an optimal solution to (10).
Remark 3.1: Theorem 3.1 provides a complete procedure
for solving (10) via (12). If the standard form LP problem
in (12) is feasible, then it contains at least one basic feasible
solution (see the definition in Section V-A). Together with
the fact that the objective value is bounded from below (e.g.,
by zero), [22, Theorem 2.8, p. 66] implies that problem (12)
contains at least one optimal basic feasible solution, which can
be used to construct an optimal solution to (10) according to
Theorem 3.1. Conversely, if the feasible set of (12) is empty,
then the feasible set of (10) must also be empty because a
feasible solution to (10) can be used to construct a feasible
solution to (12).
Remark 3.2: To ensure that an optimal basic feasible solu-
tion to (12) is found if one exists, the simplex method (e.g.,
[22, Chapter 3]) can be used to solve (12).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 will be given in Section V. Before
that, the related work are reviewed, and the assumption in (8)
is discussed.
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Rationale of the no injection assumption in (8)
Consider the case of (6) where I corresponds only to line
power flow measurements, then with the definition of H in
(1) it can be verified that (6) is equivalent to the following:
minimize
∆θ∈Rn
∥∥P (I¯, :)BT∆θ∥∥
0
+
∥∥QBTDB∆θ∥∥
0
subject to P (k, :)BT∆θ = 1
P (I, :)BT∆θ = 0.
(13)
This indicates that the considered problem in (9) is a re-
laxation [22] of the general case in (13). [8] utilizes this
observation and obtains satisfactory suboptimal solution to
(6). Alternatively, [11] considers indirectly accounting for
the term
∥∥QBTDB∆θ∥∥
0
in the objective function of (13).
[11] demonstrates that solving the following problem provides
satisfactory suboptimal solution to (13)
minimize
∆θ∈Rn
∥∥∥P˜ (¯˜I, :)BT∆θ
∥∥∥
0
subject to P˜ (k˜, :)BT∆θ = 1
P˜ (I˜, :)BT∆θ = 0,
(14)
with appropriately defined P˜ , I˜ and k˜. Notice that (14) has the
same form as (9). In conclusion, the “no injection assumption”
in (8) which leads to (9) introduces limitation, but it need
not be as restrictive as it might appear. The proposed result
in Theorem 3.1 still leads to a LP based approach to obtain
suboptimal solutions to (13) (and hence (6)).
B. Relationship with minimum cut based results
Nevertheless, the main strength of the current result lies
in the fact that it solves problem (10) where the A matrix
is totally unimodular. (10) includes (9) as a special case
5where the corresponding constraint matrix is a transposed
graph incidence matrix. This distinguishes the current work
with other ones such as [8], [11], [23] which specialize in
solving (9) using graph-based minimum cut algorithms (e.g.,
[24]). One example of A which is totally unimodular but
not associated with a graph is the matrix with consecutive
ones property (i.e., if either for each row or for each column,
the 1’s appear consecutively) [25]. For a possible application,
consider a networked control system [26], [27] with one
controller and n sensor nodes. Each node contains a scalar
state value, constant over a period of m time slots. The nodes
need to transmit their state values through a shared channel
to the controller. Each node can keep transmitting over an
arbitrary period of consecutive time slots. At each time slot,
the measurement transmitted to the controller is the sum of
the state values of all transmitting nodes. Denote z ∈ Rm as
the vector of measurements transmitted over all time slots,
and θ ∈ Rn as the vector of node state values. Then the
measurements and the states are related by z = Aθ, where
A ∈ Rm×n is a (0, 1) matrix with consecutive ones in the
each column. Solving the observability problem in (7) with
H = A can identify the vulnerable measurement slots, which
should have higher priority in communication.
C. Relationship with compressed sensing type results
Problem (10) can be written in a form more common in
the literature. Consider only the case where the null space of
AT is not empty (otherwise rank(A) = m and (10) is trivial).
With a change of decision variable z = Ax, (10) can be posed
as:
minimize
z∈Rm
‖z(I¯)‖0
subject to Lz = 0
z(I) = 0
z(k) = 1,
(15)
where L has full rank and LA = 0, and z(I¯) denotes a
sub-vector of z containing the entries corresponding to the
index set I¯ . (15) can be written as the cardinality minimization
problem considered, for instance, in [21], [28]–[30]:
minimize
z˜
‖z˜‖0
subject to Φz˜ = b, (16)
with appropriately defined matrix Φ and vector b. In this
subsection, we restrict the discussion to the standard case.
That is, (16) is feasible and Φ is a full rank matrix with
more columns than rows. As (16) is well-studied, certain
conditions regarding when its optimal solution can be obtained
by l1 relaxation are known. For example, [28], [31] report
a sufficient condition based on mutual coherence, which is
denoted as µ(Φ) and defined as
µ(Φ) = max
i6=j
|Φ(:, i)TΦ(:, j)|
‖Φ(:, i)‖2‖Φ(:, j)‖2
. (17)
The sufficient condition [30] states that if there exists a feasible
solution z˜ in (16) which is sparse enough:
‖z˜‖0 <
1
2
(
1 +
1
µ(Φ)
)
, (18)
then z˜ is the unique optimal solution to (16) and its l1 relax-
ation (i.e., problem (16) with ‖z˜‖1 replacing ‖z˜‖0). Another
well-known sufficient condition is based on the restricted
isometry property (RIP) [21], [32]. For any integer s, the RIP
constant δs of matrix Φ is the smallest number satisfying
(1− δs)‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Φx‖22 ≤ (1 + δs)‖x‖22 (19)
for all vector x such that ‖x‖0 ≤ s. The RIP-based sufficient
condition [32] states that if for some s, Φ has a RIP constant
δ2s <
√
2 − 1, then any z˜ satisfying Φz˜ = b and ‖z˜‖0 ≤ s
is necessarily the unique optimal solution to both (16) and
its l1 relaxation. It has been shown that certain type of
randomly generated matrices satisfy the above conditions with
overwhelming probabilities (e.g., [21] provides a RIP-related
result). However, the above conditions might not apply to (10),
which is the focus of this paper. For instance, consider A in
(10) being a submatrix of the transpose of the incidence matrix
of the 6-bus power network from [33]:
A =


1 −1 0 0 0 0
0 1 −1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 −1 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
1 0 0 −1 0 0
0 1 0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0 0 −1


.
Let k = 6, and I = ∅. Then the corresponding Φ in (16) and
b are
Φ =

1 1 −1 −1 −1 0 11 0 −1 0 −1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0

 b =

00
1

 . (20)
For this Φ, (17) implies that µ(Φ) = 1. Therefore, the sparsity
bound in (18) becomes ‖z˜‖0 < 1. This is too restrictive
to be practical. Similarly, for all s ≥ 1, the RIP constants
δ2s are at least one because Φ(:, 1) = −Φ(:, 3). Hence the
RIP-based sufficient condition would not be applicable either.
Nevertheless, the failure to apply these sufficient conditions
here does not mean that it is impossible to show that l1
relaxation can exactly solve (16). The mutual coherence and
RIP-based conditions characterize when a unique optimal
solution exists for both (16) and its l1 relaxation, while in
this paper uniqueness is not required. Indeed, for (16) with Φ
and b defined in (20), both [−1 0 0 −1 0 1 0]T and[−1 1 0 0 0 1 0]T are optimal (this can be verified
by inspection). Using the CPLEX LP solver [34] in MATLAB
to solve the l1 relaxation leads to the first optimal solution.
It is the main contribution of this paper to show that this is
the case in general when (16) is defined by (10), even though
the optimal solution might not be unique. The reason why the
proposed result is applicable is that it is based on a polyhedral
combinatorics argument, which is different from those of the
mutual coherence and RIP based results.
V. PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
A. Definitions
The proof requires the following definitions:
6Definition 1: Two optimization problems are equivalent
if there is an one-to-one correspondence of their instances.
The corresponding instances either are both infeasible, both
unbounded or both have optimal solutions. In the last case,
it is possible to construct an optimal solution to one problem
from an optimal solution to the other problem and vice versa.
In addition, the two problems have the same optimal objective
value.
Definition 2: A polyhedron in Rp is a subset of Rp
described by linear equality and inequality constraints. A
standard form polyhedron (as associated with a standard form
LP problem instance) is specified by {θ Cθ = d, θ ≥ 0} for
some given matrix C and vector d.
Definition 3: A basic solution [22, p. 50] of a polyhedron
in Rp is a vector satisfying all equality constraints. In addition,
out of all active constraints p of them are linearly independent.
For a standard form polyhedron with a constraint matrix of full
row rank, basic solutions can alternatively be defined by the
following statement [22, p. 53]:
Theorem 5.1: Consider a polyhedron {θ Cθ = d, θ ≥ 0},
and assume that C ∈ Rl×p and C has full row rank. A vector
θ is a basic solution if and only if Cθ = d and there exists an
index set J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , p}, with |J | = l, such that det(C(:
,J )) 6= 0 and θ(i) = 0 if i /∈ J .
Definition 4: A basic feasible solution [22, p. 50] of a
polyhedron is a basic solution which is also feasible. By
convention, the terminology “a basic feasible solution to a LP
problem instance” should be understood as a basic feasible
solution of the polyhedron which defines the feasible set of
the instance.
B. Proof
Two lemmas, key to the proof, are presented first. The first
lemma states that problem (12), as set up by l1 relaxation, has
integer-valued optimal basic feasible solutions.
Lemma 5.1: Let (x⋆+, x⋆−, y⋆+, y⋆−) be an optimal basic fea-
sible solution to (12). Then it holds that x⋆(i) , (x⋆+(i) −
x⋆−(i)) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In addition,
y⋆(j) , |A(I¯(j), :)x⋆| ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ j ≤ |I¯|, where
I¯(j) denotes the jth element of I¯.
Proof: Assume that the feasible set of (12) is nonempty,
otherwise there is no basic feasible solution (cf. Definition 4).
The following two claims are made:
(a) A(k, :) cannot be a linear combination of the rows
of A(I, :).
(b) There exists I ′ ⊂ I such that either I ′ = ∅ or the
rows of A(I ′, :) are linearly independent. In addition,
in both cases A(I ′, :)θ = 0 and A(I, :)θ = 0 define
the same constraints.
Claims (a) and (b) together imply that problem (12) can be
written as a standard form LP problem with a constraint matrix
with full row rank (i.e., matrix C below):
minimize
θ
fT θ
subject to Cθ = d
θ ≥ 0,
(21)
with
C ,

A(I¯, :) −A(I¯, :) −I|I¯| I|I¯|A(I ′, :) −A(I ′, :) 0 0
A(k, :) −A(k, :) 0 0


d ,

00
1

 θ ,


x+
x−
y+
y−

 f ,


0n×1
0n×1
1|I¯|×1
1|I¯|×1

 ,
(22)
where I|I¯| is an identity matrix of dimension |I¯|, and 1 is a
vector of all ones.
To see the claims, first note that (a) is implied by the
feasibility of (12). For (b), If I = ∅ or A(I, :) = 0, then
set I ′ = ∅. Otherwise, there exists I ′ ⊂ I with the properties
that |I ′| = rank(A(I, :)), A(I ′, :) has linearly independent
rows and A(I, :) = SA(I ′, :) for some matrix S. On the
other hand, A(I ′, :) = S′A(I, :) for some matrix S′, because
I ′ ⊂ I. Hence, A(I, :)θ = 0 and A(I ′, :)θ = 0 define the
same constraints. This shows (b).
The next step of the proof is to show that every basic
solution of (21) has its entries being either −1, 0 or 1. Denote
the matrix B1 as the first 2n columns of C, and let B˜1
be any square submatrix of B1. If B˜1 has two columns (or
rows) which are the same or negative of each other, then
det(B˜1) = 0. Otherwise, B˜1 is a (possibly row and/or column
permuted) square submatrix of A, and A is assumed to be
totally unimodular. Hence, det(B˜1) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and B1 is
totally unimodular. Next consider the matrix B defined as
B ,
[
C d
]
=

A(I¯, :) −A(I¯, :) −I|I¯| I|I¯| 0A(I ′, :) −A(I ′, :) 0 0 0
A(k, :) −A(k, :) 0 0 1


=

B1
−I|I¯| I|I¯| 0
0 0 0
0 0 1

 .
Denote the number of rows and the number of columns of B as
mB and nB respectively. Let J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , nB} be any set
of column indices of B such that |J | = mB (so that B(:,J ) is
square). If B(:,J ) contains only columns of B1, then det(B(:
,J )) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} since B1 is totally unimodular. Otherwise,
by repeatedly applying Laplace expansion on the columns of
B(:,J ) which are not columns of B1, it can be shown that
det(B(:,J )) is equal to the determinant of a square submatrix
of B1, which can only be −1, 0 or 1. Hence, by Cramer’s rule
the following holds: If v is the solution to the following system
of linear equations
B(:,J ) v = B(:, nB), J ⊂ {1, . . . , nB − 1},
|J | = mB, and det(B(:,J )) 6= 0, (23)
then
v(j) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, ∀ j. (24)
Theorem 5.1 and (23) together imply that the nonzero entries
of all basic solutions to (21) are either −1, 0 or 1. Therefore,
the basic feasible solutions, which are also basic solutions, to
the polyhedron in (21) also satisfy this integrality property.
7Finally, let (x⋆+, x⋆−, y⋆+, y⋆−) be an optimal basic feasible
solution. Then feasibility (i.e., nonnegativity) implies that
x⋆+(j) ∈ {0, 1}, x⋆−(j) ∈ {0, 1},
y⋆+(j) ∈ {0, 1}, y⋆−(j) ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ j. (25)
The minimization excludes the possibility that, at optimality,
y⋆+(j) = y
⋆
−(j) = 1. Hence, it is possible to define x⋆ and y⋆
such that
x⋆(i) , (x⋆+(i)− x⋆−(i)) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} ∀ i
y⋆(j) , (y⋆+(j) + y
⋆
−(j)) = |A(I¯(j), :) x⋆| ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j.(26)
The second lemma is concerned with a restricted version of
(10) with an infinity norm bound as follows:
minimize
x
∥∥A(I¯, :) x∥∥
0
subject to A(k, :) x = 1
A(I, :) x = 0
‖Ax‖∞ ≤ 1.
(27)
Lemma 5.2: Optimization problems (10) and (27) are
equivalent.
Proof: Suppose (10) is feasible, then it has an optimal
solution denoted as x⋆. Let I¯x⋆ ⊂ I¯ be the row index set such
that A(j, :)x⋆ 6= 0 if and only if j ∈ I¯x⋆ . Then it is claimed
that there exists a common optimal solution to both (10) and
(27) with the same optimal objective value. The argument
is as follows. The property of x⋆ implies the feasibility of
(12)
′
, which is denoted as a variant of (12) with I¯ replaced
by I¯x⋆ . By [22, Corollary 2.2, p. 65], problem (12)′, as a
standard form LP problem, has at least one basic feasible
solution. Furthermore, since the optimal objective value of
(12)′ is bounded from below (e.g., by zero), [22, Theorem 2.8,
p. 66] implies that (12)′ has an optimal basic feasible solu-
tion (x˜⋆+, x˜⋆−, y˜⋆+, y˜⋆−) which is integer-valued as specified by
Lemma 5.1. Denote x˜⋆ , (x˜⋆+ − x˜⋆−). Then x˜⋆ is feasible to
both (10) and (27) since I¯x⋆ ⊂ I¯, |A(I¯x⋆ , :)x˜⋆| ∈ {0, 1}|I¯x⋆ |
and k ∈ I¯x⋆ . Also,
∥∥A(I¯, :)x˜⋆∥∥
0
=
∥∥A(I¯x⋆ , :)x˜⋆∥∥0 ≤∥∥A(I¯x⋆ , :)x⋆∥∥0 =
∥∥A(I¯, :)x⋆∥∥
0
, as the inequality is true
because x˜⋆ is an optimal solution to (12)′. Hence x˜⋆ is optimal
to both (10) and (27), with the same objective value.
Conversely, suppose (10) is infeasible, then (27) is also
infeasible. This concludes that (10) and (27) are equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Let (x⋆+, x⋆−, y⋆+, y⋆−) be an
optimal basic feasible solution to (12). Then there exist x⋆ and
y⋆ as defined in Lemma 5.1. In particular, x⋆ = (x⋆+ − x⋆−).
It can be verified that (x⋆, y⋆) is an optimal solution to the
following optimization problem:
minimize
x,y
|I¯|∑
j=1
y(i)
subject to A(I¯, :)x ≤ y
−A(I¯, :)x ≤ y
A(k, :)x = 1
A(I, :)x = 0
0 ≤ y(j) ≤ 1 ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . , |I¯|,
where the inequalities above hold entry-wise. Because of the
property that y⋆(j) ∈ {0, 1} for all j, (x⋆, y⋆) is also an
optimal solution to
minimize
x,y
|I¯|∑
j=1
y(i)
subject to A(I¯, :)x ≤ y
−A(I¯, :)x ≤ y
A(k, :)x = 1
A(I, :)x = 0
y(j) ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j = 1, 2, . . . , |I¯|.
(28)
It can be verified that (28) is equivalent to (27). Then
Lemma 5.2 states that (28) is also equivalent to (10). Conse-
quently, (x⋆, y⋆) being an optimal solution to (28) implies that
(10) is feasible with optimal objective value being
|I¯|∑
j=1
y⋆(j). A
feasible solution to (10) is x⋆. Since y⋆(j) = |A(I¯(j), :)x⋆| ∈
{0, 1} ∀j, it holds that ∥∥A(I¯, :)x⋆∥∥
0
=
|I¯|∑
j=1
y⋆(j). Hence, x⋆
is an optimal solution to (10).
VI. NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATION
As a demonstration, instances of the restricted security index
problem in (9) are solved with P being an identity matrix
and I being empty. The incidence matrix B describes the
topology of one of the following benchmark systems: IEEE
14-bus, IEEE 57-bus, IEEE 118-bus, IEEE 300-bus and Polish
2383-bus and Polish 2736-bus [35]. For each benchmark, (9) is
solved for all possible values of k (e.g., 186 choices in the 118-
bus case and 411 choices in the 300-bus case). Two solution
approaches are tested. The first approach is the one proposed.
It is denoted the l1 approach, and includes the following steps:
1) Set up the LP problem in (12) with A being BT .
2) Solve (12) using a LP solver (e.g., CPLEX LP). Let
(x⋆+, x
⋆
−, y
⋆
+, y
⋆
−) be its optimal solution.
3) Define ∆θ⋆ = x⋆+−x⋆−. It is the optimal solution to (9),
according to Theorem 3.1.
The second solution approach to (9) is standard, and it was
applied also in [8], [11]. This second approach is referred to as
l0 approach, as (9) is formulated into the following problem:
minimize
∆θ, y
∑
j
y(j)
subject to BT∆θ ≤ My
−BT∆θ ≤ My
B(:, k)
T
∆θ = 1
y(j) ∈ {0, 1} ∀ j,
(29)
where M is a constant required to be at least
∥∥BT∥∥
∞
= ‖B‖1
(i.e., the maximum column sum of the absolute values of the
entries of B) [8]. Because of the binary decision variables in
y, (29) is a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) problem
[22]. It can be solved by a standard solver such as CPLEX.
The correctness of the l0 approach is a direct consequence
that (29) is a reformulation of (9). As a result, both the l1
and l0 approaches are guaranteed to correctly solve (9) by
theory. Fig. 2 shows the sorted security indices (i.e., optimal
objective values of (9)) for the four larger benchmark systems.
8The security indices are computed using the l1 approach. As a
comparison, the security indices are also computed using the
l0 approach, and they are shown in Fig. 3. The two figures
reaffirm the theory that the proposed l1 approach computes
the security indices exactly. Fig. 2 (or Fig. 3) indicates that
the measurement systems are relatively insecure, as there exist
many measurements with very low security indices (i.e., equal
to 1 or 2).
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Fig. 2: Security indices using the l1 approach
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Fig. 3: Security indices using the l0 approach
In terms of computation time performances, it is well-known
that the l0 approach is much more time-consuming than the
l1 approach since a MILP problem is much more difficult
to solve than a LP problem of the same size [22]. Fig. 4
shows the solve-time for computing all security indices for
each benchmark system, using the l1 and l0 approaches. It
verifies that the proposed l1 approach is more effective. In the
above illustration, all computations are performed on a dual-
core Windows machine with 2.4GHz CPU and 2GB of RAM.
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Fig. 4: Solve-time for computing all security indices for
different benchmark systems
VII. CONCLUSION
The cardinality minimization problem is important but in
general difficult to solve. An example is shown in this paper
as the smart grid security index problem in (6). The l1
relaxation has demonstrated promise but to establish the cases
where it provides exact solutions is non-trivial. Well-known
results based on mutual coherence and RIP provide sufficient
conditions under which a unique optimal solution solves both
the cardinality minimization problem and its l1 relaxation.
However, this paper identifies a class of application motivated
problems (as in (10)) which can be shown to be solvable by l1
relaxation, even though results based on mutual coherence and
RIP cannot make the assertion. In fact, the optimal solution to
(10) might not be unique. The key property that leads to the
conclusion of this paper is total unimodularity of the constraint
matrix. The total unimodularity of matrix A in (10) leads to
two important consequences. (10) is equivalent to its ∞-norm
restricted version in (27). Furthermore, (27) can be solved
exactly by solving the LP problem in (12), thus establishing
the conclusion that l1 relaxation exactly solves (10).
APPENDIX
A. Proof of the equivalence between (6) and (9)
Note that the constraint H(I, :)∆θ = 0 implies that
‖H∆θ‖0 =
∥∥H(I¯, :)∆θ∥∥
0
. Since P consists of rows of an
identity matrix and D is diagonal and nonsingular, for all
J ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, there exists a diagonal and nonsingular
matrix DJ such that P (J , :)D = DJP (J , :). In particular,
let Dkk be a positive scalar such that P (k, :)D = DkkP (k, :
) = P (k, :)Dkk. The above implies that for all ∆θ,
P (k, :)BT∆θ = 1 if and only if
P (k, :)DkkB
T (Ddd
−1∆θ) = P (k, :)DBT (Ddd
−1∆θ) = 1.
In addition, for all ∆θ
P (I, :)BT∆θ = 0 if and only if
Dkk
−1DIP (I, :)BT∆θ = P (I, :)DBT (Ddd−1∆θ) = 0.
9Finally, for all ∆θ∥∥P (I¯, :)BT∆θ∥∥
0
=
∥∥Dkk−1DI¯P (I¯, :)BT∆θ∥∥0
=
∥∥P (I¯, :)DBT (Ddd−1∆θ)∥∥0.
Applying the definition of H in (1) and a change of decision
variable to Dkk−1∆θ shows that (6) and (9) are equivalent.
B. Proof of Proposition 2.1
Part (a) is trivial.
For the necessary part of (b), condition I is necessary
because if H(k, :) = 0 then rank(H(J¯ , :)) = rank(H(J¯ ∪
{k}, :)) for all J (meaning that (7) is infeasible). Condition
II is also necessary because if rank(H) < n. then there does
not exist any J such that rank(H(J¯ , :)) = n.
For the sufficiency part of (b), assume that conditions I
and II are satisfied. Then by part (a) problem (5) is feasible.
Hence it has an optimal solution denoted as θ⋆. Define Jθ⋆ ⊂
{1, 2, . . . ,m} such that p ∈ Jθ⋆ if and only if H(p, :)θ⋆ 6= 0.
By definition of Jθ⋆ , rank(H(Jθ⋆ , :)) < n. Also, k ∈ Jθ⋆
because H(k, :)θ⋆ = 1. If rank(H(Jθ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)) = n, then
Jθ⋆ is feasible to (7), thus showing that (7) is feasible. To
show this, first consider the case when ‖Hθ⋆‖0 = 1. Then
Jθ⋆ = {k} and rank(H(Jθ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)) = rank(H) = n
because of condition II (i.e., H has full column rank). Next
consider the case when ‖Hθ⋆‖0 > 1 (i.e., |Jθ⋆ \ {k}| > 0). If
rank(H(Jθ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)) < n, then there exists θ˜ 6= 0 such
that H(Jθ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)θ˜ = 0. In particular, H(k, :)θ˜ = 0.
Also, condition II implies that H(Jθ⋆ \ {k}, :)θ˜ 6= 0 (since
otherwise Hθ˜ = 0). Let q ∈ Jθ⋆ \{k} such that H(q, :)θ˜ 6= 0.
Note also that by definition of Jθ⋆ , H(q, :)θ⋆ 6= 0. Construct
θ′ , (H(q, :)θ˜)θ⋆ − (H(q, :)θ⋆)θ˜. Then H(k, :)θ′ = 1,
H(p, :)θ′ = 0 whenever H(p, :)θ⋆ = 0, but H(q, :)θ′ = 0
while H(q, :)θ⋆ 6= 0. This implies that θ′ is feasible to (5) with
a strictly less objective value than that of θ⋆, contradicting the
optimality of θ⋆. Therefore, the claim that rank(H(Jθ⋆∪{k}, :
)) = n is true. This implies that Jθ⋆ is feasible to (7),
establishing the sufficiency of part (b).
For part (c), under conditions I and II both (5) and (7)
are feasible. In addition, Jθ⋆ constructed in the proof of
the sufficiency part of (b) satisfies |Jθ⋆ | = ‖Hθ⋆‖0, for θ⋆
being an optimal solution to (5). This means that the optimal
objective function value of (7) is less than or equal to that of
(5). For the converse, suppose that J ⋆ is optimal to (7), then
the feasibility of J ⋆ implies that there exists θJ ⋆ 6= 0 such that
H(J¯ ⋆, :)θJ ⋆ = 0. This also implies that ‖HθJ ⋆‖0 ≤ |J ⋆|.
If H(k, :)θJ ⋆ = 0, then H(J¯ ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)θJ ⋆ = 0. This
implies that rank(H(J¯ ⋆ ∪ {k}, :)) < n, contradicting the
feasibility of J ⋆. Therefore, there exists a scalar α such that
H(k, :)(αθJ ⋆) = 1. Consequently, αθJ ⋆ is feasible to (5) with
an objective function value less than or equal to the optimal
objective function value of (7).
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